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The Adam Walsh Act: Un-Civil Commitment
by EMILY ESCHENBACH BARKER*

Introduction
Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006 ("the Adam Walsh Act") with the aim of "protect[ing]
children from sexual exploitation and violent crime."' Among other
measures, the Act creates a National Sex Offender Registry,
establishes a post-conviction civil commitment scheme,' increases
punishments for a variety of federal crimes against children,4 and
strengthens existing child pornography prohibitions.' The scope of
this note is limited to an analysis of the commitment portion of the
Act ("Commitment Provision").
This provision authorizes the
federal government to civilly commit, in a federal facility, any
''sexually dangerous" person "in the custody" of the Bureau of
Prisons-even after that person has completed his entire prison
sentence.
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari' on question of
whether or not enactment of the Commitment Provision was within

* The author is a 2010 Juris Doctor Candidate of the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, and would like to thank her parents, Barb and Jess Barker,
for their constant support and Professor Faigman for his guidance throughout.
1. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §
302, 120 Stat. 587, 620-22 (2006).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 16919 (2009).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2009).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2009).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (2009).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2009).
7. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct.
2828 (U.S. June 22, 2009) (No. 08-1224).
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Congress's authority.8 This note will show that Congress lacked the
authority to enact the Commitment Provision under either its
enumerated or incontestable federal powers.
The discussion will begin with an overview of the relevant
Supreme Court precedents bearing on a constitutional determination
of this kind. This note will show that a proper reading of these
precedents demonstrates that the clause upon which the federal
government most often defends its power to regulate this subject, the
Commerce Clause," is wholly inapplicable to an act like the Adam
Walsh Act-legislation aimed at criminal law enforcement where
States historically have been sovereign.
Next will be an evaluation of the current split between the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ( "Fourth Circuit" ) and the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ( "Eighth Circuit" ). This note will
show that only the Fourth Circuit, which held the Commitment
Provision beyond congressional authority, performed an extensive
analysis of the relevant Supreme Court precedents in reaching its
holding. The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, relied only on its
own, distinguishable precedents. Thus the only Circuit court to
analyze the constitutionality of the Commitment Provision under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence has found it to be
unconstitutional.
This note will show further that the Commitment Provision does
not fit readily into the specific schemes where federal civil
commitment has be found constitutional-namely in situations where
it is used to prevent and prosecute federal crimes.
Finally, this note will show that the Commitment Provision does
not satisfy the due process rationales for which the Supreme Court
has found state-authorized civil commitment constitutional. The
8.

The Question Presented is:

Whether Congress had the constitutional authority to enact 18 U.S.C. 4248,
which authorizes court-ordered civil commitment by the federal government of
(1) "sexually dangerous" persons who are already in the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons, but who are coming to the end of their federal prison sentences, and (2)
"sexually dangerous" persons who are in the custody of the Attorney General
because they have been found mentally incompetent to stand trial.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Comstock, 129 S.Ct. 2828 (No. 08-1224).
9. The term "incontestable federal powers" as discussed in this note are the powers
incident to the unquestioned power to prosecute acts that may validly be made crimes
pursuant to the exercise of some enumerated power.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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structure of the Commitment Provision neither comports with the
classic' rationale for lower proof burdens in state civil commitment
schemes, nor does it provide for a probable cause hearing within a
reasonable amount of time and the general practice is to keep
prisoners locked for months beyond their release dates.
I. The Adam Walsh Act
The Adam Walsh Act was enacted in 2006.12 A Senate sponsor
described it as "the most comprehensive child crimes and protection
bill in our Nation's history."' 3 Section 4248 of the Act contains the
Commitment Provision, which authorizes the federal government to
initiate commitment proceedings with respect to any federal prisoner
in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons ("the Bureau"). 4 Under this
provision, even prisoners who have never been previously charged
with or convicted of a sex crime may be civilly committed after
completing their entire prison sentence. 5
To initiate civil commitment proceedings, the Bureau must
certify the individual as a "sexually dangerous person."' 6 The statute
defines a "sexually dangerous person" as one who "has engaged or
attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation
and who is sexually dangerous to others," and who suffers from a
severe mental illness such that he would "have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released.' ' 17 However, neither "sexually violent conduct" nor "child
molestation" is defined by the statute. The Attorney General is not
required to present any evidence or make any preliminary showing in
the certification; he need only include an allegation of dangerousness
to create an effective certification. 8 With this certification alone, the
Bureau can automatically stay a person's release from prison for the

11. See infra section V.B.
12. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587 (2006).
13. 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
14. These individuals need not necessarily be prisoners; the Adam Walsh Act also
applies to persons committed to the custody of the Attorney General based on
incompetence to stand trial, and to persons against whom all criminal charges have been

dismissed solely for reasons relating to their mental condition. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2009).
15.
16.

18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2009).
18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2009).

17. 18 U.S.C.
18.

§ 4247(a)(5)-(6) (2009).

18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2009).
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duration of the civil commitment proceedings. 19 This stay is truly
automatic. The Commitment Provision contains no requirement of a
judicial probable cause hearing before or within a reasonable time
after the Bureau's initial certification of dangerousness, even if the
certification causes the prisoner to be detained beyond his scheduled
dates of release. 0
Once certified, an individual is entitled to a hearing on the fact of
"sexual dangerousness," but again, there is no requirement that this
occur within a reasonable amount of time and the court need only
find "by clear and convincing evidence that the person is... sexually
dangerous" to commit him. 1 If the government meets this burden,
the individual is committed to the custody of the Attorney General
for care and treatment until a state assumes responsibility, or until
"the person's condition is such that he is no longer sexually dangerous
to others" or will not be sexually dangerous to others if released
under an appropriate regimen of treatment. 22 In other words, unless
some state assumes responsibility, the statute authorizes federal
confinement for as long as the person remains "sexually dangerous."23
The decision as to whether or not the person continues to pose a
threat is left with the director of the facility in which they are
committed.24 If the director determines the prisoner no longer poses a
threat, he must file a certificate to that effect with the court that
ordered the commitment. 25 At this point, it is the burden of the
accused party to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are
cured.26 If the prisoner meets this burden, only then will the court
order them discharged, on condition of medication if necessary.27

19. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2009).
20. See United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 336 (D. Mass. 2007).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2009). The burden of proof in criminal proceedings is
"beyond a reasonable doubt," and although most civil commitment schemes use the clear
and "convincing standard," the rationales for this lower burden are not applicable in the
case of the Commitment Provision. See infra section V.B.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d)(2) (2009).
23. Id.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e) (2009).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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II. Congress Does Not Have the Authority To Enact the
Commitment Provision Under Its Enumerated Federal Powers
Congress exceeded the scope of its federal power when it
enacted the Commitment Provision. The Constitution creates a
federal government of certain enumerated powers--"[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."2 9 As James Madison wrote, "[t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite."30 Thus, in order for any act to be
constitutional, Congress's authority to enact it must come from some
incontestable or enumerated federal power.
A. Congress Does Not Have Authority To Enact The Commitment
Provision Under The Necessary and Proper Clause
In enacting the Commitment Provision, Congress created a law
that on its face purports to regulate conduct not within the ambit of
its enumerated powers. Congress appears to base its authority to
enact this statute largely on the Necessary and Proper Clause, but it
did not lay this out explicitly anywhere in the legislation.' Even if
Congress had been explicit in this assertion, the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not intrinsically provide for congressional authority to
enact legislation.32 The Necessary and Proper Clause simply
authorizes Congress "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution... all... Powers vested by [the]
Constitution in the Government of the United States. 3 3 That is, the
Clause by itself creates no constitutional powers; 34 it merely allows

Congress to enact legislation auxiliary to an enumerated or
incontestable federal power.3" Thus, for enactment of the Adam
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
30. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS 292-93 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Penguin 1961) (1788).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
18. See United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d 931 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd, 565 F.3d 497
(8th Cir. 2009).
32. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl.
18.
34. Id.
35. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
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Walsh Act to be within congressional power, it must be a necessary
and proper means to achieve ends within Congress's existing
enumerated or incontestable federal powers."
B.

Congress Does Not Have Authority To Enact The Commitment
Provision under The Commerce Clause

In the cases where the constitutionality of the Commitment
Provision has been challenged, the government most often defends its
federal power over this matter on the ground that enactment of the
Commitment Provision is within its Commerce Clause authority."
Nothing in the Commitment Provision, however, lends itself to such a
justification. The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 gives
Congress the "power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States., 38 The Commitment Provision is in no
way directed at commerce regulation or any economic activity for
that matter. It is simply a "civil remedy" aimed at protecting the
public from sexual dangerousness and is therefore not the type of
legislation typical of Commerce Clause justification.3 9
There are several Supreme Court cases analyzing the scope of
congressional authority to enact these non-economic, criminal
statutes. Through its decisions in United States v. Lopez, 40 United
States v. Morrison,' and Gonzales v. Raich,42 the Supreme Court has
laid out the factors that must be considered in a determination of
whether a law such as the Commitment Provision falls within the
Congress's Commerce Clause authority: (1) Are there specific
congressional findings as to whether the subject of the statute
substantially affects interstate commerce? 43 ; (2) Is the language of the
statute of a non-economic, criminal nature and therefore of the type

36. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
37. See United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d 931 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 540 (E.D.N.C. 2007); United States v. Abregana,
574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133-34 (D. Haw. 2008); United States v. Dowell, No. CIV-06-1216D, 2007 WL 5361304, at 7 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2007); United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp.
2d 317, 328 (D. Mass. 2007); United States v. Carta, 503 F. Supp. 2d 405, 407-08 (D. Mass.
2007).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
39. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2009).
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
41. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
43. Id.
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that the Court has identified as being a province of the states?44; (3) Is
this something the states usually regulate? 45 ; and (4) Does the statute
include a jurisdictional element to ensure its application only to
situations involving interstate commerce?"
In Lopez,47 the Court analyzed whether Congress had the
authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 ( "Gun-Free Act" ).48 The Gun-Free Act made it
a federal offense for an individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a
school zone.4 9 In that case, a twelfth-grade student was arrested for
possessing a concealed handgun and bullets at his San Antonio high
school." The government argued that the "possession of a firearm in
a school zone may result in violent crime and that violent crime can
be expected to affect the functioning of the national economy" for
two reasons': first, because
"the costs of violent crime are
substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are
spread throughout the population"52 ; and second, because "violent
crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within
the country that are perceived to be unsafe." " The Government also
argued "that the presence of guns in schools pose[d] a substantial
threat to the educational process by threatening the learning
environment." 5"The Court found these arguments unpersuasive and
held that the Gun-Free Act was a "criminal statute that by its terms
ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise" and thus did not come within Congress's Commerce
Clause Authority.5 The Court found pivotal to this determination
that the Gun-Free Act contained no jurisdictional element to ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
had the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.56 The Court

44.

Id

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(I) (2009).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)(2009).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id.
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explained that without some sort of jurisdictional nexus, the
Government's arguments would stretch the federal authority to
almost endless breadth."
We pause to consider the implications of the Government's
arguments. The Government admits, under its "costs of
crime" reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.
Similarly, under the Government's "national productivity"
reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found
was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens:
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for
example. Under the theories that the Government presents in
support of [the Gun-Free Act], it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been
sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 8
Another aspect of the Gun-Free Act which the Lopez Court
found problematic was that "[n]either the [Gun-Free Act] nor its
legislative history contain[ed] express congressional findings
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a
school zone." "
The Lopez Court concluded by holding that Congress may
"regulate the use and channels of commerce" ; it "may regulate
and protect the instrumentalities of commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce" ; and it "may regulate those things having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce." ' The Court found that
because the Gun-Free Act contained no jurisdictional element linking
its authority to interstate commerce and the Act's legislative history
shed no light on a valid regulatory purpose, the Gun-Free Act
involved neither the channels nor the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and did not regulate something that substantially affected

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 563.
Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 558-59.
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interstate commerce.6' Thus, it held the Act was beyond Congress's
regulatory reach under the Commerce Clause.62
Applying the analytical framework of Lopez to the Commitment
Provision, one comes to a similar conclusion. Like the Gun-Free Act
at issue in Lopez, the Commitment Provision contains no
jurisdictional element assuring that civil commitment of "sexually
dangerous" persons has some nexus with interstate commerce. The
statute, by its terms has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of
economic enterprise; it is simply a civil remedy aimed at sexual
dangerousness. Neither does the Commitment Provision have any
congressional findings as to whether or not civil commitment of
sexually dangerous persons substantially affects interstate commerce.
By its terms, the Commitment Provision makes no attempt to relate
its regulatory authority to commerce or any other sort of economic
enterprise. Thus, according to Lopez, it seems apparent that the
subject which the federal government aims to control through the
Commitment Provision, i.e., sexual dangerousness, concerns neither
the channels of commerce nor the instrumentalities of commerce.
The only real question is whether its provisions are somehow
"substantially related" to interstate commerce such that Congress has
the power to enact this legislation.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison
makes clear that the Commitment Provision is in no way
"substantially related" to interstate commerce. In Morrison, the
Supreme Court analyzed whether Congress had the power to enact
the Violence Against Women Act 63 ( "VAWA" ), which provided a6
federal civil remedy to the victims of gender-motivated violence.
The government argued that this law came within Commerce Clause
authority because "Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce."65 The Court rejected this argument, stating
that "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal
nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that
case."66 The Court explained that the government's argument which

61. Id. at 562-64.
62. Id.
63. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1799-1800 (1994).
64. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 617.
66. Id. at 610.
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"seeks to follow the but-for causal chain from the initial
occurrence
of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been the prime
object of the States' police power) to every attenuated effect upon
interstate commerce" 17 could not be upheld.
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local. In recognizing this fact we
preserve one of the few principles that has been consistent since
the Clause was adopted. The regulation and punishment of
intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always
been the province of the States. Indeed, we can think of no
better example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than
68 the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.
After the Court rejected the notion that Congress had the
authority to enact legislation directed at intrastate violence when that
violence was not directed at interstate commerce, the Court moved to
an analysis of whether or not the conduct regulated by the VAWA
substantially affected interstate commerce. The Court explained that
it is "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, [that] legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained., 69 The Court held that the conduct which the VAWA
attempts to regulate did not substantially affect interstate commerce
because "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity." 70 The Court came to this
conclusion despite the fact that the VAWA, in contrast to the GunFree Act in Lopez and the Commitment Provision here, was
supported by numerous congressional findings regarding the serious
impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their
families.7
Like the VAWA, the Commitment Provision regulates neither
the channels nor the instrumentalities of commerce. It is a civil
remedy aimed at sexual dangerousness, which is no more an
economic activity than the gender-motivated violence targeted by the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
138, at

Id. at 615.
Id. at 617-18 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 614 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. No. 10340 (1993); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 (1990)).
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VAWA. A "costs of crime" justification cannot be made because
Morrison shows that the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
aggregation principle when a law regulates non-economic violent
criminal conduct.
The Supreme Court's most recent Commerce Clause opinion,
Gonzales v. Raich,7 does not alter the core holding in Morrison that
Congress lacks authority to regulate non-economic sexual violence.
In Raich, the Court sustained the drug prohibitions of the Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA") as applied to the intrastate cultivation and
use of medical marijuana. 73 Relying on the rationale of Wickard v.
74
Filburn,
the Court reasoned that Congress could regulate this purely
local activity as part of regulating "an economic class of activities that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce., 75 In other words,
the Raich court held that Congress can regulate a non-economic,
intrastate activity only when such regulation is necessary and proper
to the success of an otherwise valid comprehensive scheme aimed at
regulating interstate economic activity. In contrast to the CSA, the
Commitment Provision is aimed at non-economic, intrastate activity
and "constitutes no part of a 'comprehensive' legislative scheme...
target[ing] interstate markets., 76 Thus following the Lopez-MorrisonRaich framework, the Commitment Provision does not substantially
affect interstate commerce.
III. A Closer Look at The Current Circuit Split
Two circuit courts have addressed the issue of whether the
Commitment Provision comes within Congress's Commerce Clause
authority. In United States v. Comstock, the Fourth Circuit found that
the Commitment Provision lay outside the Commerce Clause power. 77
The court came to this conclusion only after a thorough analysis of
the Lopez-Morrison precedents. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit
found the Commitment Provision to be within Congress's legislative
authority under both the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses in United States v. Tom.78 However, it came to its conclusion

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at 13, 32-33.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (internal quotations omitted).
United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 280 n.6 (4th Cir. 2009).
Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279.
United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 502-03 (8th Cir. 2009).
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by relying on its own distinguishable precedents and performed no
meaningful analysis of the applicable Supreme Court cases.
A. The Fourth Circuit Finds the Commitment Provision
Unconstitutional Based on an Analysis of Current Supreme Court
Precedents.

In Comstock, the government argued that the federal
government had the authority to enact the Commitment Provision
under its Commerce Clause powers. The Fourth Circuit found this
argument unpersuasive and held that the Commitment Provision was
beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority because it targeted
neither "the channels of interstate commerce... [n]or persons and
things in interstate commerce" and "[l]ike the statutes at issue in
Lopez and Morrison,... [it] contain[ed] no jurisdictional requirement
limiting its application to commercial or interstate activities., 79 As to
whether the Commitment Provision regulates something which
"substantially affects" interstate commerce, the. Fourth Circuit found
that "Morrison forecloses any such argument. '"" The court explained

that, like VAWA, the Commitment Provision merely "provides a civil
remedy aimed at the prevention of noneconomic sexual violence" and
that the Morrison Court's rationale for rejecting Commerce Clause
authority applied equally to the case of the Commitment Provision:
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence.., has
always been the province of the States. Indeed, we can think of
no better example of the police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States,
than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.81

The court noted further that the target of the Commitment
Provision (sexual dangerousness), like the target of the Morrison
statute (gender-motivated violence), was "not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity."' "Like the gender-motivated violence
banned in Morrison, sexual dangerousness does not substantially

79. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 279-80 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 280.
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affect interstate commerce. 83
Indeed, unlike Morrison, the
Commitment Provision contains no legislative findings to the
contrary. The Fourth Circuit concluded that "Supreme Court
precedent thus compels the conclusion that [the Commitment
Provision] does not constitute a valid exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. ' ' 4
B. The Eighth Circuit Finds the Commitment Provision Constitutional
Based Only on Its Own Precedents.

In contrast to the Fourth's Circuit's holding in Comstock, the
Eight Circuit found the Commitment Provision to be within
Congress's legislative authority under both the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses in United States v. Tom." The Eighth
Circuit came to this conclusion, however, by relying upon its own
precedents, while inexplicably failing to analyze the Commitment
Provision under Lopez and Morrison.' After laying out the Lopez
categories as the proper framework in which to analyze the
Commitment Provision,"" the court, without explanation, stops short
and launches into an analysis based on its own precedent in United
States v. May.88 Yet May involves an analysis of a wholly
distinguishable provision of the Adam Walsh Act, the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), which criminalizes
the failure to register as a sex offender.89 The May court found that
SORNA did not violate the Commerce Clause because by its terms, it
"requires the government to prove [the individual] traveled in
interstate or foreign commerce" thereby creating a sufficient
jurisdictional nexus between the aims of the statute and the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce. 9° The statute "thus derives its
authority from each prong of Lopez-and most specifically, the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 502-03 (8th Cir. 2009).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 502 ("In Lopez the Supreme Court identified three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate through the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (internal quotations omitted)).
88. Id. at 502.
89. United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2008).
90. Tom, 565 F.3d at 502 (quoting May, 535 F.3d at 921).
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ability to regulate 'persons or things in interstate commerce' and 'the
use of the channels of interstate commerce."' 9' In contrast to
SORNA, the Commitment Provision contains no requirement that
the prisoner have moved though interstate commerce and, as a
prisoner must be in federal custody to be certified, it is not readily
apparent how it would be possible for the prisoner to travel at all.
To address this logical flaw, the Eight Circuit points to another
one of its decisions, United States v. Howell,92 where it concluded that
SORNA's registration requirement was valid even when applied to
sex offenders who never crossed state lines.93 The court only came to
this conclusion in Howell, however, because it found that SORNA's
registration requirements "furthered a legitimate end under the
commerce clause[sic]-the tracking of the interstate movement of sex
offenders., 94 The court based this determination on the fact that
"SORNA's registration requirements [were] reasonably adapted to
the legitimate end of regulating persons or things in interstate
commerce and the use of the channels of interstate commerce."95
Unlike SORNA, the Commitment Provision is not reasonably
adapted to the legitimate end of regulating persons in Commerceprisoners subject to the Commitment Provision are already in the
custody and control of the federal government, and there is no
jurisdictional requirement creating a proper nexus between "sexual
violence" and interstate commerce. Thus, the Provision does not
further any apparent, legitimate federal interest.96 The reason that
SORNA falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause-that it aims
to regulate movement of people through commerce-is simply not
applicable to the Commitment Provision, a civil remedy aimed at
sexual dangerousness.
Despite this glaring distinction, the Tom court held that "like

...

SORNA,... [the Commitment Provision] [wa]s a rational and
appropriate means to effectuate legislation authorized by the
Constitution."' 97 This holding presumes the proposition which it is

91. Id.
92. United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2009).
93. See Tom, 565 F.3d at 503.
94. Id. (quoting Howell, 552 F.3d at 715-16).
95. Id. (quoting Howell, 552 F.3d at 717).
96. The Eighth Circuit does go into a discussion of Greenwood v. United States, 219
F.2d 376 (1955), and the power to prosecute federal crimes; however, as section III.B of
this note will show, that is not applicable here.
97. Tom, 565 F.3d at 504.
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meant to prove: that the legislation is authorized by the Constitution.
One can follow the Howell-May argument that (1) SORNA is
constitutional because it is legislation authorized by the Constitution;
and (2) that the legislation is authorized by the Constitution
according to the reasoning in Lopez and Morrison because it is aimed
at regulating movement of persons through commerce. However, the
Tom court's inferential leap in applying this SORNA precedent to the
Commitment Provision is untenable. The Commitment Provision is
not aimed at regulating the movement of persons through commerce;
thus, it is not authorized by the Commerce Clause and therefore is
not constitutional.
It is worth mentioning that the district court in Tom relied on
Morrison and Lopez when it found the Commitment Provision
unconstitutional.9" The district court held that Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause authority by enacting the Commitment Provision
because the statute was "unrelated to economics but rather aim[ed] to
regulate and prevent noneconomic criminal conduct that traditionally
has been the province of the States [sic]." ' Furthermore, the district
court rejected the argument that the Commitment Provision was
"'necessary and proper' for effectuating a constitutionally vested
power."' ' The district court's holdings and reasoning thus closely
parallel the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Comstock. Yet, upon being
presented with the district court's opinion, the Eighth Circuit chose to
follow its own distinguishable precedent without analyzing either the
holding of the lower court or the holding of the only other circuit
court to have heard the issue.
The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is not persuasive-the
Commitment Provision does not involve the instrumentalities or
channels of commerce, nor does it substantially affect interstate
commerce. Therefore, according to Supreme Court precedents of
Lopez and Morrison,it does not come within the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. Because the Necessary and Proper Clause
does not create any independent authority, the Commitment
Provision is thus void unless it is the necessary and proper exercise of

98. United States v. Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d 931, 935 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd, 565 F.3d
497 (8th Cir. 2009).
99. Id. at 937.
100. Id. at 938.
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some incontestable federal power not explicitly enumerated within
the Constitution. "
IV. Congress Does Not Have the Authority To Enact the
Commitment Provision Under Its Incontestable Federal Powers
This note has shown that enactment of the Commitment
Provision was not within Congress's explicitly enumerated powers.
The next pertinent inquiry is whether or not it had the authority
under some other incontestable federal power. 2 For this analysis, it
is instructive to look to federal civil commitment schemes that have
been held constitutional as necessary and proper exercises of
congressional authority, despite the fact that they were not supported
by any enumerated power.
A. The Power To Prevent Federal Crimes

The Supreme Court has allowed civil commitment in the federal
context based on the power to prosecute in limited circumstances. In
order to fit within the framework laid out by the relevant case law, an
act's commitment scheme must be narrowly tailored to address a
specific federal crime which was created to protect a particularly
federal interest.0 3
One such commitment scheme was established by the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 ("BRA"). 14 Under the BRA, a federal court
may detain an arrestee pending trial if the government demonstrates
by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions "will
reasonably assure.., the safety of any other person and the
community."' 5 In United States v. Perry,"°6 the Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit ("Third Circuit") explained that although the
language "safety of the community" appears unqualified, this portion
of the BRA only comes into play after "a finding by a judicial officer

101. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
102. In certain circumstances, "because Congress has the power to proscribe the
activities in question, it has the auxiliary authority, under the necessary and proper clause,
to resort to civil commitment to prevent their occurrence." United States v. Perry, 788
F.2d 100, 111 (3d Cir. 1986).
103. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
104. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2)(B) (2009).
106. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
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of probable cause to believe the defendant committed certain serious
violations of the Controlled Substances Act., 10 7 Thus the Third
Circuit found that the BRA's civil commitment provision was
necessary and proper to prevent the future commission of specifically
enumerated federal crimes. The Perry court stressed that the BRA
was written in such a way as to regulate "only danger to the
community from the likelihood that the defendant will, if released,
commit one of the proscribed federal offenses."' ' Thus, the Perry
court found the BRA contained a clear connection between the
pretrial detentions and the government's interest in preventing a
future federal crime.'09 This connection is of course critical, since the
federal government, unlike the states, has no power to legislate for its
citizens' general welfare. In United States v. Salerno," the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the BRA, emphasizing its
"narro[w] focus on a particularly acute problem in which the
Government interests are overwhelming .... The Act operates only
on individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of
extremely serious offenses..' ' .
The Adam Walsh Act on the other hand, does not purport to
limit itself to jurisdiction of prisoners that are likely to commit
specifically federal crimes. Rather it applies to any and all federal
prisoners who are certified as "sexually dangerous." In Comstock,
the government argued that the Commitment Provision constituted a
necessary and proper exercise of its power to prevent "sex-related
crimes.""' However, "the federal government simply has no power to
broadly regulate all sex-related crimes, as [the Commitment
Provision] purports to do.""' 3 As the Fourth Circuit explained,
"federal statutes regulating sex crimes are limited in number and
breadth, specifically requiring a connection to interstate commerce,
or limiting their scope to the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."".4 In contrast, the Commitment Provision "targets 'sexual
dangerousness' generally, without any requirement that this
undefined danger relate to conduct that the federal government may
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 110.
id. at 111.
Id. at 110.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Id. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2009).
United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
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constitutionally regulate.""'
The Provision refers to no specific
federal crime at which it is aimed and thus creates no nexus between
the crimes it attempts to prevent and an established federal power.
The definition of "sexually dangerous" in the Commitment Provision
thus "sweeps far too broadly to be a valid effort to prevent federal
criminal activity.""' 6 Furthermore, most crimes of sexual violence are
punishable solely under state law, and thus, the commitments effected
under the Adam Walsh Act will most often be directed at conduct
prohibited only by state law."' For these reasons, the rationale found
in Perry and Salerno-thatCongress had the power to enact the BRA
as a necessary and proper means to effectuate their power to create
federal crimes-does not bring the enactment of the Commitment
Provision within Congress's federal powers.
B. The Power To Prosecute Federal Crimes

The Supreme Court has found several federal civil commitment
schemes constitutional under the federal power to prosecute federal
crimes, but only in very limited circumstances, none of which apply
here. The Tom court cited the Supreme Court case Greenwood v.
United States in support of its finding that the Commitment Provision
is a necessary and proper exercise of the federal power to prosecute
federal crimes.1 8 The holding in Greenwood, however, is limited to
the circumstances of that case and inapplicable in the context of the
Adam Walsh Act.
In
Greenwood, the Supreme
Court
addressed
the
constitutionality of a federal civil commitment statute allowing for the
commitment of mentally ill persons unable to stand trial."9 The Court
upheld the statute as a necessary and proper exercise of the federal

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. In 2004, states had in their custody approximately 153,800 prisoners convicted of
rape or other sexual assault. See William J. Sabol et al., Prisonersin 2006, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE 8, table 8 (Dec. 2007), http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p06.pdf. This number is
approximately equal to the total number of persons in federal prison for any crime. See id.
at 2, table 1 (indicating approximately 188,000 total federal inmates in 2005). Those
convicted of sexual crimes constitute a very small percentage of the federal total. See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of FederalJustice Statistics, 2003, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE 62, table 4.2 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs03.pdf (indicating
that federal convictions for violent sexual offenses, "obscene material," and "non-violent
sex offenses," together constituted less than 2 percent of all federal convictions).
118. United States v. Tom 558 F. Supp. 2d. 931,938-39 (D. Minn. 2008).
119. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
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power to prosecute, but specifically noted that this was only because
the power to prosecute had not yet expired.
Justice Frankfurter
wrote:
The power that put [the accused] into such custody-the power
to prosecute for federal offenses-is not exhausted.
Its
assertion in the form of the pending indictment persists.... This
commitment, and therefore the legislation authorizing
commitment in the context of this case, involve an assertion of
authority, duly guarded, auxiliary to incontestable national
power. As such it is plainly within congressional power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause."'
Unlike the statute at issue in Greenwood, the Adam Walsh Act's
Commitment Provision is not written in such a way as to apply only to
those individuals for whom a trial is pending. 2 Rather, it applies
most often to those in federal custody who have already stood trial
and thus for whom the power to prosecute has already expired. In
such a circumstance, no authority auxiliary to the incontestable
federal power to prosecute remains and therefore the Commitment
Provision cannot be a necessary and proper exercise of Congress's
power to prosecute.2 3 The Fourth Circuit said as much in Comstock
where it found that:
Greenwood only approved the federal civil commitment of
persons who had been charged with federal crimes but found
incompetent to stand trial, and for whom no state would take
custody. Greenwood certainly did not approve the federal civil
commitment of persons.., who have stood trial, been
convicted, and fully served all federal prison sentences.
Accordingly, because no federal prosecution has been

120. Id. at 375.
121. Id.
122. The language of the Act says that it applies to persons in federal custody. 18
U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2009). Thus, it is possible that at times it could be applied to
persons in federal custody awaiting trial. As of this writing, all cases addressing the
constitutionality of the commitment involve prisoners serving federal criminal sentences.
See supra note 35.
123. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir. 1986) ("What Greenwood
teaches, therefore, is that the federal government may resort to civil commitment when
such commitment is necessary and proper to the exercise of some specific federal
authority. Congress may not, however, authorize commitment simply to protect the
general welfare of the community at large.").
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frustrated here, we 24cannot sustain [the Commitment Provision]
under Greenwood.
The Tom court's holding that the Commitment Provision comes
within the federal power to prosecute is thus incorrect, and the its
reliance on Greenwood is improper.
V. Even if the Commitment Provision Is a Necessary and
Proper Exercise of Some Federal Power,
It Is Externally Limited By the Due Process Clause
A. A Federal Civil Commitment Scheme Cannot Satisfy Due Process
Under the Same Rationale As State Civil Commitment Statutes
A state has the authority, under its broad parens patriae powers,
to legislate for the general good of its citizens."' Part of this historical
parens patriae power even includes a duty to protect "persons under
legal disabilities to act for themselves."'26 This power also gives states
the authority to make laws to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of its citizens who are mentally ill. 127 It is for
these reasons that a state, in the exercise of its police powers, may
confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of
significant antisocial acts.' Unlike the states, the federal government
has no general police or parens patriae power.9 Thus, although "the
federal government may resort to civil commitment when such
commitment is necessary and proper to the exercise of some specific
federal authority, Congress may not authorize commitment simply to
protect the general welfare of the community at large." 3 '
This distinction becomes important in an involuntary civil
commitment proceeding where due process is satisfied by balancing
an individual's interest in his or her liberty against well-recognized

124. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2009).
125.

53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 7 (2009).

126. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); see also The Late Corp. of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1889).
127.

53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 7 (2009).

128. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975); cf. Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-29 (1905).
129. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
130. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1986).
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state interests."' With their parens patriae powers, states have not
only the right, but also the duty to commit certain persons in order to
ensure the safety of the accused as well as those in the community.'
These rights and duties play a large part in tipping the due process
balance of interests in favor of the states. A state's legitimate
interests and authority in creating civil commitment schemes arise
from two sources: "its police power to protect the community" at
large and "its parens patriae power [to provide] care to its citizens
who are unable to care for themselves because of their emotional
Because the federal government has no such rights or
disorders."''
duties, a balance of interests will come out more favorably for the
accused in the federal sphere.
The balance tips further toward the interests of the accused when
one considers the double standard the Commitment Provision
creates. States have a duty to protect their citizens and a duty to
uphold the Constitution. Thus when faced with the dilemma of a
dangerous person who cannot be tried because of mental incapacity,
states face a serious conflict of duties which creates the need for the
civil commitment procedure. However, in situations in which the
Commitment Provision is asserted against federal prisoners, it is
necessarily visited upon those who have already been found
competent to stand trial. 34 It is a double standard to find these
federal prisoners competent to stand trial in a criminal proceeding, let
them serve their sentences, and then subject them to civil
commitment proceedings upon release. This is especially true when
these civil proceedings are historically allowed only as a last-ditch
answer to an unsolvable problem particular to states-how to
reconcile their duty to keep citizens safe with their duty to uphold
constitutional due process. The Adam Walsh Act creates a civil
commitment scheme despite a complete lack of this conflict in the
federal sphere; prisoners subject to the Commitment Provision have

131.

See AM. JUR. supra note 125.

132. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); see also The Late Corp. of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1889).
133. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
134. See United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d 931 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133-34 (D. Haw. 2008); United States v.
Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 540 (E.D.N.C. 2007); United States v. Dowell, No. CIV06-1216-D, 2007 WL 5361304, at 7 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2007); United States v. Shields, 522
F. Supp. 2d 317, 328 (D. Mass. 2007); United States v. Carta, 503 F. Supp. 2d 405, 407-08
(D. Mass. 2007).
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already been found capable to stand trial and the federal government
has no broad parens patrie powers to legislate for the good of its
people.
Because Congress has no general police powers-the powers
upon which the constitutionality of state civil commitment schemes
are predicated-it cannot create a federal civil commitment regime
unless that regime is predicated upon some enumerated or
incontestable federal power. As this note shows, enactment of the
Commitment Provision was not within any federal power and thus its
enactment violates Due Process.
B.

The Commitment Provision's Process Does Not Comport with the
Classic Rationale for Lower Proof Burdens in Civil Commitment
Proceedings and Thus Violates Due Process

Generally, a person's liberty is only at stake in criminal
proceedings where the burden of proof is the very high "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. Civil commitment, on the other hand,
requires only that the government prove by "clear and convincing"
evidence that a person poses a threat to society. Still, a civil
commitment is the taking of liberty and it is important to highlight the
distinction, albeit a fine one, between penal incarceration aimed at
retribution and civil commitment born out of necessity. Civil
commitment is meant to protect the accused and/or the public from
future conduct, while criminal incarceration is meant to punish past
conduct. Civil commitment proceedings have a lower standard of
proof than criminal proceedings, not because the end result, loss of
liberty, is any less devastating in a civil commitment context, but
rather because of the predictive nature of a civil commitment inquiry.
Unlike a criminal inquiry, in which the finder of fact must divine the
likelihood of past conduct, a civil commitment inquiry tasks the factfinder with predicting the likelihood of the occurrence of a future
event. When a court or jury must determine whether or not someone
is "mentally ill," or "mentally incompetent," they are dealing with
factors that "render certainties virtually beyond reach. 1 35 Even a jury
packed with the likes of Nostradamus would be hard pressed to find
the likelihood that a future event will occur to be "beyond a
reasonable doubt" and the use of the clear and convincing standard in
civil commitment hearings is to make the sometimes-necessary civil

135. Id
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commitment possible. 31 6 The Supreme Court has been explicit in
explaining that the questions posed to a finder of fact in a civil
commitment proceeding
are
substantially different
from
"straightforward factual question[s]" found in criminal proceedings.1 7
In order to make a determination of "sexual dangerousness"
under the Commitment Provision, the finder of fact must decide two
questions: (1) has there been some past conduct in which the person
has "engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or
child molestation[?]"' 38 ; and (2) what is the likelihood the person will
pose a "sexual [danger] to others" in the future? 39 The first of these

prongs seems to be of the kind not likely to suffer the human
infirmities inherent in the prediction of the future. It is merely a
determination of a fact. This in and of itself makes it different from
the civil commitment purpose, "which is premised on the prevention
of future acts.' ' 40 The clear and convincing standard, though
justifiable when adjudicating in terms of the regular civil commitment
scheme where certainties are impossible, is not appropriate in a case
such as this, where at least part of the inquiry is whether some act
happened in the past. When, rather than making an attempt to
predict future dangerousness or to determine competence, part of the
question is a straightforward factual question of a past act of the kind
classically within the criminal realm, there is no justification for a
lower proof standard. Therefore, the Commitment Provision's
structure does not comport with the classic rationales for a lower
proof burden in civil commitment proceedings and its lower burden
violates due process.

136. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 422 (1979).
137. Id. at 429-33.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2009) ("'[S]exually dangerous person' means a person
who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation .... ").
139. See id. § 4247(a)(6) ("'[S]exually dangerous to others' with respect a person,
means that the person suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a
result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct
or child molestation if released.").
140. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-57 (1992).
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C. The Commitment Provision Violates Due Process Because It Makes
No Provision for a Probable Cause Determination Within a
Reasonable Amount of Time
A civil commitment is a seizure and may be made only with a
showing of probable cause to a neutral magistrate. " ' However the
statutory language of the Commitment Provision fails to provide for
any probable cause determination by a neutral decision maker prior
to the full-blown commitment proceeding. Rather, an individual
certified under the Commitment Provision is automatically subject to
detention past his scheduled date of release based solely on the
submission of a certificate by the Attorney General, the Director of
the Bureau, or their designee. Despite this, the Commitment
Provision contains no provision for a judicial probable cause hearing
before or within a reasonable time after the Bureau's initial
certification of dangerousness, even if that certification causes the
prisoner to be detained beyond his scheduled dates of release. 4 2
There is not even an evidentiary standard for the certificate.' 3
Further, the certificate can be issued up until the moment that an
individual is released from federal custody.'4' In fact, the general
practice seems to be that the government certifies individuals very
near their release dates and that these individuals spend months to
years in prison between their scheduled release dates and the date of
their hearings. 45 Thus, even if the Commitment Provision is found to
be constitutional on its face, it does not satisfy due process as applied
because it makes no requirement that the time between certification
and the hearing be reasonable, and the government in fact has
generally kept people incarcerated for months.
Conclusion
the

This note has shown that Congress lacked the authority to enact
Commitment Provision under either its enumerated or

141. Ahern v. O'Donnell, 109 F.3d 809, 815-16 (1st Cir. 1997); Villanova v. Abrams,
972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 69-71
(1992).
142. United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 336 (D. Mass. 2007).
143. The proposed regulations allow certification only whenever there is "reasonable
cause" to believe an individual is "sexually dangerous." See Civil Commitment of a
Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. 43205 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at
28 C.F.R. Part 549).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2009).
145. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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incontestable federal powers. The Provision itself does not give any
guidance as to where Congress derives legislative authority over
general sexual dangerousness and the clause upon which the federal
government most often defends its power to regulate this subject, the
Commerce Clause, is wholly inapplicable to this legislation, which is
aimed at criminal law enforcement where States historically have
been sovereign. Of the two circuit courts that have addressed this
issue, the only one to have performed a thorough analysis of
applicable Supreme Court precedents has found that the
Commitment Provision does not fall within Congress's Commerce
Clause authority. The civil commitment scheme contemplated by the
Adam Walsh Act is not a proper exercise of Congress's power to
prevent and prosecute federal crimes and fails to satisfy Due Process
as well. More specifically, the structure of the Commitment Provision
neither comports with the classic rationale for lower proof burdens in
state civil commitment schemes nor does it provide for a probable
cause hearing within a reasonable amount of time and the general
practice is to keep prisoners locked for months beyond their release
dates. For these reasons, the Commitment Provision of the Adam
Walsh Act and Congress' enactment of it are unconstitutional.
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